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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On  March  25,  1982  the European  Community --the EC-- celebrated 
its twenty-fith anniversary.  It was  an occasion both for 
celebration and reflection. 
--'celebration,  because  the European  Community  had  come  a  long 
way,  sometimes  slowly  and erratically,  from its early beginnings 
in the  late 1950s.  It had created not  only  a  "common  market" 
which  allowed for  the free movement  of  goods,  services,  and 
people,  but also  the underpinningsof  a  united Europe. 
--Reflection,  because Europe still has  a  long  way  to goto achieve 
full integration and  a  measure  of unity.  In  these  times of 
economic  uncertainty,  the EC  is experiencing  a  kind of  "identity 
crisis"  of early adulthood,  The  European  idea remains  firmly 
imbedded in European  society.  It represents the rejection of 
nationalism and  war  which riddled Europe  for generations.  Yet, 
there exists  a  mood  of uncertainty  abou~ the future  and  frustration 
- --
about the best way  to deal with  the apparently intractable_ economic 
and  international problems  of the  1980s,  from which  the EC  is not 
immune. 
Part of this sense of  uncertainty and frustration  comes  from  the 
current nature of  US-EC  relations.  I  am  not making  a  startling 
revelation if I  tell you that US-EC  relations are severely strained. 
While  this  covers all aspects of the  relationship -- military,  poli-
tical and  economic -- I  will limit myself to the  important economic 2 
, 
. problems  in the Atlantic relationship. 
-.  ~ . 
·us-Ee  economic relations are -- it seems  to me  -- at a  watershed. 
They  ar~ set against a  backdrop of converging political,  economic, 
and military problems.  This  is perhaps what makes  this latest 
"crisi~~ in Atlantic relations more  apparent  than  those that 
have marked  the relationship since the  1950s. 
What  is the background to this situation? 
- first,  there is a  persistent economic deterioration on  both sides 
of  the Atlantic.  High  inflation,  staggering levels of unemployment, 
low or even negative  growth,  and  stifling interest rates  are 
fueling  a  deep  sense of pessimism  among  the people  of the  United 
States and Western Europe. 
- secondly,  there is the continued growth of the Soviet Union's 
military power  - strategic,  theater,  and  conventional  - and of 
its unabated proclivity to pursue interventionistic policies in 
Central Europe  and  the  Third World. 
- thirdly,  on  a  political level,  forces  are appearing,  which  may, 
if unchecked,  lead on  one side to  the  development  of  a  mood  of nee-
isolationism and  on  the other to the emergence of pacifist and 
neutralist forces. 3 
· Yet  Europ~an and American  objectives are  the  same  in the world 
- today.  However,  we  often differ on  how  best to achieve  them. 
The  two most important economic policy areas where  the allies 
.  .:.  ~ 
seem  to nave  heightened the  level of discord in recent months 
are:  . .  .. 
-
East-West relations, 
- Transatlantic trade issues. 
\ 
II.  EAST-WEST  RELATIONS 
Differences  in approach  and perceptions on  how  best to conduct 
East-West policy have  never  been better illustrated than  in the 
case of the reaction to  the  situation in Poland. 
European  and  US  objectives in Poland are the  same: 
the end  of  the martial  law; 
the release of  those arrested; 
- the  resumption of  a  general dialogue with the 
Church  and Solidarity. 
Popular  reaction in Europe  towards  the  situation has  been  as  strong, 
if not stronger,  than here. 4 
. We  have  also recognized Soviet  "responsibility",  for  the recent 
. developments  in Poland. 
Yet,  we  have  diverged1 and  the  US,  in particular,  has  criticized 
the European  decision to proceed with the pipeline deal with  the 
soviet .Union. 
The  conclusion of the Siberian Natural  Gas  Pipeline  contract ia 
part of Europe's  strategy of diversifying its energy sources, 
.  ' 
which will reduce  the percentage of oil in its energy  imports, 
an objective which  the  United States has  also sought for itself. 
The  E.C.  nations  import over  50%  of their primary  energy  needs 
(the  United States imports  less than  20%}. 
The  increase in overall Eruopean  dependence  on  Soviet gas will 
not be  that important when  the pipeline is completed,  and  cannot 
be  reasonably  used  as  a  means  to exert pressure.  Further diversi-
fication of sources  and  stockpiling of energy resources  can occur 
in the meantime. 
In addition,  the cancellation of the pipeline proposal would  have 
an  impact on  employment at a  time  of high and  rising unemployment 
a  much  greater impact in Europe  than in the United States;  since 
only  some  $300  million of  US  exports would be affected as  opposed 
to several billion  for European  companies. 5 
-At  the  same time,  we  have  been more  than willing to take  a  wide 
range of-unified actions  designed  to demonstrate  European  concern 
about developments  in Poland,  and whose effect would  be greater 
on  the s·oviet Union  than  on  the allies. 
These  ac~ions take into account  both the need  to preserve  some 
East-West  exchanges  and  to demonstrate Western dissatisfaction 
with Soviet objectives in Poland. 
The  EC  Council of Ministers  and  the'Commission have: 
- pledged that they would  not undermine  sanctions 
imposed  by  the  US  against Poland; 
- taken  steps to  impose  certain economic  measures 
against Poland  such  as  the cancellation of  subsidized 
food  sales  and credits; 
- undertaken measures  that would raise the price for 
egregious soviet behavior  by reducing  the availability 
of  hard currency,  something it severely needs,  by 
reducing  imports  from  the Soviet Union. 
In recent weeks  also,  Western European nations  and  the United 
States have  been working together on ways  to coordinate  a  common 
approach  and  policy towards  the use of Western financial credits 
by  the Soviet Union  and its Warsaw Pact allies. 6 
·, 
·II.  TRANSAT-LANTIC  TRADING  FRICTIONS 
1.  The  EC  and  trade 
I  would  like now  to turn to the area of most  concern  to me 
in recent months  - the mounting  transatlantic economic disputes 
that risk  leading  us  down  the dangerous path of protectionism. 
Before  we  examine  the  nature of  these disputes,  I  would  like to 
remind  you  of  some  basic statistics that underpin the  US-European 
economic  relationship. 
- twenty-five years  ago,  as  the European  Community 
was  being  born,_  the  combined  GNPs  of  the original 
six members  was  a  mere  $  165  billion as  compared 
to  $  441  billion in the  US. 
- today,  the EC-10  member  states have  a  combined 
GNP  of  $  2.8  trillion,  about  the  same  as  the 
United States. 
- the  EC  countries group  some  270  million people. 
The  US  population  now totals  230  million. 
- the European  Community  - whose  development  was 
supported  and  even nurtured by  successive  US 
Administrations  - has  become  the world's  largest 
single  trading  bloc  and  a  powerful  competitor  for 
the  United States. .  . . 
.. 
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•  the  US  and EC,  at the  same  time,  are 
each other's major  customer; 
•  the  US  maintained about  a  $  11  billion 
trade  surplus with the  EC  in  1981  ($  20 
billion in 1980) ~ 
~ 
-imports and.exports  from  and  to third countries 
(extra-EC  trade)  constituted over  20%  (36%  intra-
EC  trade)  of  the EC's  gross national product 
( 12%  for  US); 
- European  imports of manufactures  from  the 
developing  countries  (as  a  percentage of  GNP)  are 
24%  larger  than  those of  the  US. 
- the Community  imports  90%  of its raw materials. 
The  development of the European  Community  has  been  based primarily 
on  the principles of  the  libe~alization of trade  - intra-European, 
transatlantic and worldwide  • 
•  the  EC  and its executive body,  the  Commission, 
by coordinating the  trade policies of  sovereign 
nations,  have  acquired primary responsibility for 
carrying out European  trade policies and  negotiating 
international trade agreements  and  reducing barriers 
to trade within the context of  GATT. '. 
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,  the EC  has  been  responsible for defusing mounting 
.protectionist pressuresin Europe,  from  the  chemical 
and  textile industries for  example. 
in recent months,  our objectives vis-a-vis the 
United States have  been to avert  a  trade war  erupting 
over  growing  disagreement with our American allies on 
agricultural and  industrial goods. 
2.  Agriculture 
In the  field of agriculture,  there  has  been  a  marked deteriora-
tion between  the  United States and  Europe • 
•  some  US  Government officials,  consummated,  it seems, 
by  a  great desire  to export,  are  "escalating"  agricul-
tural disputes  and  heightened the level of rhetoric.  In 
particular,  they have  attacked the EC  for  subsidizing 
exports • 
.  we  Europeans,  belive that we  have  abided by  the  rules 
of  GATT  negotiated in the Multilateral Trade  Negotia-
tions,  and which  allow subsidies as  long  as  they  do 
not entail the acquisition or more  than  an  equitable 
market  share in third markets.  Using  the  same  base 
years,  EC  agricultural exports  as  a  percentage of world 9 
·  agricultural trade,  have  risen from  10%  to  11.4%  bet-
ween  1971  and  1980 while  the  US  share went  from  14%  to 
17%  in the  same  period.  Yet  a  number  of  cases  have 
been brought against us  in GATT. 
There  is· great concern in Europe regarding the possible  intention 
on  the part of  the  US  trade and agricultural officials to seek 
a  renegotiation of  GATT  rules  on  agriculture  should the  US  complaints 
not  go  their way. 
Such  an eventuality would  leave the door  open  for retaliatory and 
protectionist measures  in Europe,  where  the farmer  is also expe-
riencing  a  severedecline in his  level of  income. 
3.  Steel 
Another area of irritation concerns European steel exports  to 
the  United States. 
- petitions under  anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty statutes have  been filed by  the American steel 
~dustry against producers  in seven member-states 
of  the European  Community.  This  has  created  a 
powder  keg  which must  be  defused. 
- the  US  steel producers  claim that European countries 
are subsidizing their steel exports.  Our  view is .. 
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that the steel industry's difficulties are to be 
ascribed to the worsening  of  the  US  economic situation 
which,  in particular,  led to  a  spectacular drop  in 
the  demand  for  steel on  the American market. 
- the filing of  these cases  has  created  a  high degree 
of  uncertainty among  European  steel producers,  who 
will hesitate ·.to export,  leading to more difficulties 
for  a  seriously troubled  industry in Europe. 
-these complaints filed  by  the,US  steel industry 
constitute a  form of harassment to us. 
4.  Interest rates 
Just  a  word  about  a  recent  - but not  new  - transatlantic economic 
problem. 
High  US  interest rates have  become,  once again,  a  cause of concern 
for  European  governments  and  financial officials. 
The  interdependence of  our  economies  and  monetary  systems  make 
the projected  US  budget deficits and  high interest rates  a  matter 
of concern in Europe • 
•  high interest rates make it difficult fdr European 
countries to  reduce  their own  interest rates1 thereby 
stifling economic  recovery and  growth. . .  .. 
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•  the recent monetary instability reflected in overly 
_high  interest rates and considerable volatility of 
the exchange  rates has  worsened  the economic crisis 
and  impeded  economic  recovery on  the European  side 
of  the Atlantic. 
•  failure  to achieve  some  measure  of  economic  growth 
can only  add  fuel  to protectionist demands. 
s.  Fighting protectionism 
Economic  dislocation,  persistent recession and  uncertainty about 
the future  make  people  more  inward-looking. 
The political will  and  courage of  governments  coupled with the 
recollection of  the  consequences of beggar-thy-neighbor policies 
in the  1920s  and  1930s are the  only ramparts  - it seems  - against 
economic warfare  and  ultimately destruction of  the international 
trading  system all of us  believe in and wish  to preserve. 
US  proposals  to enact "reciprocity"  legislation to ensure  equal  access 
for  US  goods  to foreign markets  not only challenge  the rules of 
international trade as  they have  evolved over  ~he past twenty years, 
but risk initiating many  world-wide protectionist measures. 
The  main  economic  challenge to the Western world  today  therefore 
is to resist protectionism. 12 
.Protection~sm is ultimately  a  more  dangerous  phenomenon  than  the 
pacifist·or nee-isolationist expression of vocal minorities.  It 
can  severely damage  the entire fabric of  our relationship and 
"spillo~er"  into other aspects of the relationship,  exacerbating 
differences  even further  • 
.  . . 
V. · CONCL1JSION 
I  do  not want  to  leave  you  on  a  pessimistic note,  although  I  am 
unfortunately convinced  that the  US-European relationship will 
continue  to worsen  before it gets better. 
I  am  equally convinced,  however,  that over  the  long  run,  our 
common  interests and  shared heritage will help us  surmount whatever 
problems  come  between us. 
While Europe  and  America  may  have  almost continuous  - it seems  -
disagreements  on  how  to deal with many  issues,  there are  enough 
common  beliefs among  us  to make  us  able to overcome  our differences. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  we  must  learn better to understand one 
another. 
Western Europe  and  the United States are  both  committed  to the 
maintenance of an  open Atlantic security and  economic  system. 13 
·Honest disagreements will alway exist on  how  best to approach 
common  probleJt!s: 
.. 
•  the management  of  the East-West relationship 
in both its economic  and military dimensions; 
•  the alleviation of poverty and  underdevelopment 
in the Southern hemisphere; 
•  and  the promotion of  a  free  and  open  trading  system. 
The  solution to this latest  seri~s of disputes will require  a  renewed 
commitment  to consult more  intensely,  coordinate policies more 
effectively,  and especially to understand better each other's 
perceptions on  how  to deal with challenges which  in and of  themselves, 
and  taken individually,  are  no  more  serious than they  have  been  in 
the past. 
This process of consultation,  coordination and  understanding is 
not  an  easy  one  to carry out.  It will take  courag~,  wisdom,  and 
mutual trust.  These  are qualities which  are  in abundance within 
an alliance of free  and  democratic  societies.  And  I  trust they 
will inexorably emerge  once  again to preserve that alliance and 
fulfill its objectives. 